Regulators and financial commentators recently have expressed concerns that the implications of foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) are not transparent to investors as a result of missing or insufficient financial statement disclosures. To shed light on these concerns, we investigate firms' noncompliance with ASC 740 provisions requiring financial statement disclosure of PRE (and the unrecorded deferred tax liabilities associated with PRE). Based on a sample of S&P 500 firms from 1999 to 2010, we find that (1) a significant portion of firms fail to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements for PRE, (2) noncompliance spans a long window of time and is an issue among even the largest, most sophisticated firms in the U.S. capital markets, and (3) the amounts of undisclosed PRE (and the related tax) are substantial in magnitude. Further analysis suggests that firms strategically choose not to comply with the PRE (and related tax) disclosure requirements under ASC 740. We find that compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements for PRE increases with the materiality of the unrecorded tax liability associated with PRE, for firms operating in more litigious or less competitive industries, and after the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which increased incentives to disclose PRE.
a statement that calculating the tax is not practicable. To shed light on recent concerns regarding the transparency and sufficiency of PRE disclosures, we investigate firms' noncompliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements for PRE (and its related tax) and identify factors associated with any noncompliance.
To examine noncompliance with required PRE disclosures, we analyze financial statement disclosures of S&P 500 firms from 1999 through 2010. To identify firms required to disclose PRE, we review the financial statement disclosures for two specific disclosures. First, we look for an explicit disclosure of PRE or the tax due upon repatriation of PRE. If a firm discloses PRE or the tax due upon repatriation of PRE in a given year, we classify the firm-year as a required PRE disclosure year. Second, we review effective tax rate reconciliations for disclosure of a tax benefit of foreign earnings (i.e., firms showing a lower effective tax rate that (a) is attributable to foreign earnings that are subject to a lower current tax rate than the U.S. tax rate and (b) has not been offset by deferred U.S. taxes due on repatriation of those earnings). To ensure the foreign tax benefit reported in the effective tax rate reconciliation does not reflect foreign tax credits not attributable to PRE, we eliminate firm-year observations in which the source of the tax rate benefit is ambiguous.
1 This process yields a sample of 3,416 firm-year observations subject to the ASC 740 mandatory disclosure requirements. Using this sample, we conduct our analysis in four stages.
In our first stage, we estimate the amount of PRE and the related tax due upon repatriation (TAX) for each firm. 2 Estimating PRE and TAX represents an important departure from prior studies that rely on the assumption that PRE financial statement disclosures are accurate and forthcoming (i.e., PRE is disclosed if it exists and the taxes on PRE are disclosed if they are practicable to calculate). This 1 Section 3.2 describes the method used to identify firms required to disclose PRE in detail. We confirmed the validity of our method with an ASC 740 expert working for a Big 4 accounting firm and with a Big 4 accounting partner serving large multinational S&P 500 clients with required PRE disclosures. Adding further credence that our method allows us to correctly identify firms with PRE that fail to comply with disclosure requirements, we note that 85 percent of our sample firms that do not disclose their PRE amount (i.e., non-disclosers) acknowledge they have PRE. See Appendix B for a sample disclosure for a firm acknowledging PRE but failing to disclose the PRE amount. 2 Beginning in Section 3, we use variable names to differentiate between reported PRE (PRE Reported ) and estimated PRE (PRE Estimated ) as well as reported TAX (TAX Reported ) and estimated TAX (TAX Estimated ). For simplicity, we do not use these variable names in Sections 1 and 2.
estimation allows us to (a) quantify the economic magnitude of undisclosed PRE and TAX amounts and (b) make stronger conclusions regarding firms' compliance with mandatory TAX disclosures (i.e., the impracticability of calculating TAX). We base our estimate of TAX on hand-collected annual effective tax rate (ETR) reconciliation data, which provide the tax benefit associated with not recording deferred tax expense on earnings designated as PRE. We estimate TAX as the three-year sum of accumulated tax benefits (net of any expenses) associated with earnings designated as PRE during this period. While estimating TAX using three years of data understates the actual tax due on repatriation of cumulative PRE, this estimate should be sufficient to (a) provide a lower bound of undisclosed TAX, (b) evaluate cross-sectionally how the magnitude of TAX influences disclosure, and (c) assess the practicability of estimating TAX. We estimate PRE by first grossing up the estimated TAX by the difference between the U.S. statutory rate and the firm's foreign effective tax rate to produce an estimate of the foreign pretax earnings classified as PRE. Since PRE is an after-tax number, we multiply the estimated foreign pretax earnings by one minus the foreign effective tax rate to estimate the firm's PRE. Correlation analyses of our estimates of PRE and TAX with reported PRE and TAX for firms disclosing these amounts suggest that our estimates are reasonable (i.e., estimated PRE and reported PRE are correlated at 0.57; estimated TAX and reported TAX are correlated at 0.91) and should serve their intended purposes.
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This analysis provides several interesting conclusions regarding firms' choices to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements of ASC 740. First, we find that a nontrivial percentage of sample firms do not disclose PRE despite electing to designate a substantial amount of their earnings as PRE.
Specifically, we find that annually 11.7% to 18.2% of our sample S&P 500 firms required to disclose PRE fail to do so, with estimated annual aggregate undisclosed PRE ranging from a low of $9.9 billion to a high of $84.2 billion (and an estimated annual average undisclosed PRE per non-discloser ranging from 3 In addition, for firms required to but previously not disclosing PRE, we find that the correlation between estimated PRE and reported PRE in the first year PRE is disclosed equals 0.51. Similarly, for firms required to but previously not disclosing TAX, we find that the correlation between estimated TAX and reported TAX in the first year TAX is disclosed equals 0.98. The high correlations in the first year of disclosure suggest it is unlikely that the calculation of PRE and TAX is fundamentally more difficult for non-disclosers than it is for disclosers. See footnote 11 for anecdotal evidence that TAX non-disclosers calculate TAX regularly despite disclosing that it is "not practicable to calculate." a low of $320 million to a high of $1.96 billion). Regarding TAX disclosures, we find that annually 72.9% to 81.2% either disclose that TAX is not practicable to calculate or provide no mention of TAX at all. The large percentage of firms not disclosing TAX is interesting given that (a) the majority of these firms (71.1%) calculate and disclose the tax benefit associated with current year foreign earnings that are deemed permanently reinvested annually in their effective tax rate reconciliation and (b) we are able to derive reasonable estimates of TAX from the effective tax rate reconciliations. 4 We estimate the annual aggregate undisclosed TAX ranges from a low of $9.57 billion to a high of $82.23 billion (and the estimated annual average undisclosed TAX per non-discloser ranges from a low of $60 million to a high of $300 million). 5 These results suggest that (a) a significant portion of firms fail to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements for PRE, (b) noncompliance spans a long window of time and is an issue among even the largest, most sophisticated firms in the U.S. capital markets (i.e., S&P 500 firms), and (c) the amounts of undisclosed PRE and TAX are substantial in magnitude.
In the second and third stages of our analysis, we examine the determinants of a firm's choice to comply with the mandatory PRE and TAX disclosure requirements, respectively. Given that the PRE designation has been the source of considerable public scrutiny and the PRE and TAX disclosures, by their nature, reveal strategic information regarding the firm's investment abroad (i.e., the amount and duration of earnings invested abroad and the related tax costs of repatriating such investment), we view the related disclosures as costly and anticipate that compliance with the mandatory disclosure 4 This finding is also interesting given that (a) firms are able to calculate and record deferred tax liabilities on foreign earnings not designated as PRE and (b) the financial reporting designation of foreign earnings as PRE has no impact on the complexity of calculating potential taxes owed upon repatriation. For example, Cognizant's December 31, 2002 tax footnote contends that calculating the TAX on 2002 earnings designated as PRE is not practicable because of the various methods by which such earnings could be repatriated in the future, despite the fact that Cognizant calculates, records, and discloses the deferred tax liability on the same type of earnings (all related to the same Indian subsidiary) from 2001 and earlier. We note that the methods of repatriation or tax owed upon repatriation in 2002 did not vary based on whether a firm designated foreign earnings as PRE. 5 The range of the annual estimated aggregate undisclosed TAX is similar in magnitude to the range of the annual estimated aggregate undisclosed PRE because the vast majority of firms do not disclose TAX, while a smaller portion of firms fail to disclose PRE. As expected, however, the annual average undisclosed TAX per nondisclosing TAX firm is much lower than the annual average undisclosed PRE per non-disclosing PRE firm. requirements will vary cross-sectionally with the associated costs and benefits of disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia 1983 ).
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We model a firm's choice to comply with the mandatory PRE disclosure requirements as a function of the magnitude of estimated PRE and estimated TAX as well as other variables previously shown to influence disclosure decisions (i.e., that proxy for disclosure costs and benefits). We find a positive association between PRE disclosure and estimated TAX but no association between PRE disclosure and estimated PRE. These results suggest that concern over the magnitude of the unrecorded TAX (i.e., the unrecorded liability associated with PRE) motivates PRE disclosure as opposed to the magnitude of the PRE itself. We also find that firms operating in more litigious or less competitive industries are more likely to disclose PRE, suggesting that legal concerns, which increase the cost of nondisclosure (e.g., Skinner 1994), and proprietary costs, which increase the cost of disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia 1983) , are significant determinants of mandatory PRE disclosure compliance. Collectively, these results suggest that firms strategically choose not to comply with the mandatory PRE requirements.
We model a firm's choice to disclose TAX similarly to the choice to disclose PRE. We find that firms are more likely to disclose TAX if they operate in a less competitive industry (again consistent with lower proprietary costs) or if they have lower institutional ownership (consistent with increased demand for additional disclosures when information asymmetry is high). Interestingly, we find a negative and significant association between TAX disclosure and estimated TAX, suggesting that firms are less likely to disclose the TAX as the magnitude of the estimated TAX increases. This evidence is consistent with firms choosing to disclose that estimating TAX is not practicable or provide no mention of TAX when the financial statement impact of the TAX is larger. Consistent with Robinson et al. (2011) Second, this study contributes to the growing literature that investigates noncompliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (e.g., Barth et al. 1997; Li et al. 1997; Gleason and Mills 2002; Robinson et al. 2011; Rice and Weber 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Peters and Romi 2013; Robinson and Schmidt 2013) . By providing evidence that firms strategically choose not to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in a setting involving a long-standing mandatory disclosure requirement where (a) there is no ambiguity in the requirement or nature of the disclosure or underlying transactions requiring disclosure, (b) the market should be aware that managers have private information regarding PRE (because financial statements reflect the tax benefit of permanently reinvested earnings), (c) the firms are heavily followed by market participants, and (d) the required disclosures either require minimal effort (as is the case for PRE) or calculations that should be routine for sophisticated firms (as should be the case for TAX), this study can be viewed as establishing a lower bar for mandatory disclosure noncompliance. In other words, if firms exhibit noncompliance in our setting, firms are even more likely to exhibit noncompliance in more complex, less transparent settings.
By providing evidence that firms in highly competitive industries are less likely to disclose PRE and TAX, this study also suggests that (a) the effect of proprietary costs on mandatory disclosure compliance varies across settings (i.e., with the specific proprietary costs of different required disclosures) and (b) disclosing earnings permanently reinvested abroad (i.e., earnings "trapped" abroad) has higher
proprietary costs than disclosures in other settings (e.g., detailed compensation disclosures or environmental liabilities). This is important in light of the mixed evidence regarding the relation between mandatory disclosure compliance and proprietary costs (e.g., Li et al. (1997) , Robinson et al. (2011) , and Chen et al. (2013) find no relation; Robinson and Schmidt (2013) find a relation). Finally, by providing evidence of increased PRE (but not TAX) disclosure post-AJCA, our study suggests that mandatory disclosure compliance is not only influenced by the current regulatory environment (e.g., SEC enforcement actions as in Robinson et al. 2011) , but also managers' anticipation of future regulatory action that would affect the net cost of compliance. This result suggests that regulators need to consider not only the immediate impact of a temporary regulation but also how that temporary regulation may affect future expectations and, thus, distort managerial behavior.
Third, this study develops an estimate of PRE and TAX that is independent of whether firms actually explicitly disclose such information. Existing research examining the implications of PRE relies on disclosed PRE. It is possible that the implications (e.g., likelihood that management invests "trapped" funds in projects that yield low returns, etc.) of PRE may vary based on whether PRE is disclosed in the financial statements. As such, these estimates have implications for future research. Relative to the decades of research investigating the determinants of voluntary disclosure, firm compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements has garnered substantially less attention. Indeed, most studies utilizing financial statement information assume that firms comply with related mandatory disclosure requirements (e.g., Botosan 1997; Collins et al. 2001; Francis et al. 2008) . Existing studies, however, do provide evidence of noncompliance with required disclosures relating to environmental liabilities (Barth et al. 1997; Li et al. 1997; Peters and Romi 2013) , legal liabilities (Chen et al. 2013) , tax contingencies (Gleason and Mills 2002; Robinson and Schmidt 2013) , executive compensation information (Robinson et al. 2011) , and internal control weaknesses (Rice and Weber 2012) . 9 These studies generally view firms' compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements as a response to regulatory requirements and incentives for voluntary disclosure (e.g., Barth et al. 1997) . Consistent with voluntary disclosure incentives influencing compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements, prior studies provide evidence that compliance is increasing in (1) the size and estimated materiality of the item 8 ASC 740-30-50-2 does not impose a materiality threshold for disclosure, but simply requires disclosure whenever a firm takes advantage of the PRE exception. However, SEC rules generally only require public firms to disclose material information (e.g., Regulation S-X, Rule 4-02 and Rule 4-08(h)(2)). Because our sample selection process requires that a firm's SEC filings include some PRE related disclosure to be identified as required to disclose, we believe that, by construction, our methodology only identifies those firms with material PRE (and TAX). 9 Additional studies identify potential noncompliance but do not investigate further because noncompliance is beyond the scope of those studies. For example, see Kinney et al. (2004) regarding mandatory audit fee disclosure and Li et al. (2012) regarding opportunistic management forecasts that seemingly violate disclosure rules. (Barth et al. 1997; Gleason and Mills 2002) , (2) regulatory oversight (Barth et al. 1997) , (3) access to capital markets (Barth et al. 1997; Chen et al. 2013) , (4) litigation risk and publicity (Li et al. 1997; Gleason and Mills 2002) , (5) the absence of specific managerial incentives for noncompliance (Robinson et al. 2011) , and (6) SEC enforcement action (Robinson et al. 2011 ).
II. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PRIOR LITERATURE
Despite providing important insight into mandatory disclosure compliance, prior evidence must be viewed in light of the following limitations. First, it is possible in some of these settings (e.g., loss contingencies or tax contingencies) that the ambiguous nature of the standards or underlying transactions, rather than management's attempt to disclose strategically, is the source of noncompliance. For example, Barth et al. (1997, p. 36) acknowledge that, if managers determine that (an environmental liability) disclosure is most appropriate, "the level and content of such disclosures are not well-specified, again permitting managers considerable discretion in determining what information to disclose." Second, the difficulty in estimating the information possessed by management in prior literature (both in terms of dollar amount and materiality) often limits the ability to conclude management is willfully noncompliant.
For example, Chen et al. (2013, p. 11) note that until the final contingent (legal) liability is determined, it is possible that non-disclosing managers "may be truly uninformed about the likelihood of case resolution and/or the materiality of case outcomes" and there is no credible way to distinguish non-disclosing uninformed managers from strategically non-disclosing informed managers. 10 Finally, in settings examining recently enacted standards (e.g., Robinson et al. 2011; Robinson and Schmidt 2013) , it is possible that management simply is slow to comply with the new standards, due to uncertainty surrounding the requirements, resource constraints, or lack of regulatory enforcement during the early period of a standard, making it difficult to generalize evidence to more "steady state" disclosure requirements.
There are several characteristics of our setting that make it unique relative to prior studies. are based on the firm's line item disclosures of material differences between the U.S. statutory tax rate and the firm's effective tax rate due to foreign operations. Thus, by construction, the estimated PRE and TAX amounts are material for our sample firms. Third, because our estimates are based on effective tax rate reconciliation items disclosed in the tax footnote, we can identify that managers have declared PRE regardless of whether they choose to comply with the ASC 740 disclosure requirements. Fourth, PRE and TAX are based on historical, verifiable information. Accordingly, disclosing PRE requires minimal calculation or managerial effort. Likewise, disclosing TAX requires firms to apply current tax laws and rates to historical PRE amounts, a process that should (a) not stretch the abilities of the most sophisticated firms in the U.S. and (b) be conducted routinely to make informed investment, tax, and financial reporting decisions.
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These characteristics are important for at least two reasons. First, because firms must determine a specific plan for reinvestment of earnings to qualify for the PRE designation, they have access to detailed information about PRE. 12 Therefore, any non-disclosure of PRE by firms in our sample can be viewed as strong evidence of noncompliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements under ASC 740. Second, 11 Discussions with an international tax director for a mid-cap publicly traded firm (not in our sample of S&P 500 firms) provide insightful anecdotal evidence of the importance of the TAX calculation for firms with PRE even when footnote disclosures indicate that it is not practicable to calculate TAX. Specifically, despite disclosing that TAX is not practicable to calculate in its financial statements (which is allowed under ASC 740), the international tax director indicated that the firm maintains a comprehensive model that tracks foreign earnings and the costs to repatriate the earnings, the results of which are presented semi-annually to the firm's treasurer and board of directors. Providing additional support for the argument that the TAX calculation is key to the decision to repatriate, the international tax director added that the company continuously monitors federal tax legislation and searches for isolated instances where it can take advantage of cost-effective opportunities to repatriate. Separate discussions with a tax executive for another publicly traded firm (included in our sample) echoed the previous discussion. Specifically, the executive acknowledged despite disclosing that it is not practicable to calculate TAX, the firm annually evaluates the cost to repatriate earnings to the U.S. 12 Anecdotal evidence supports this assertion. For example, Genuine Parts Co. received a comment letter from the SEC related to the firm's 2011 fiscal year 10-K requesting PRE disclosure. In their response to the SEC's comment letter, Genuine Parts acknowledged $291 million in previously undisclosed PRE, as opposed to arguing that they had not tracked the information.
because the market should be aware that managers have made PRE elections for our sample firms (e.g., because financial statements reflect the tax benefit of foreign earnings), PRE and TAX disclosures provide an interesting setting to examine noncompliance. Specifically, if S&P 500 firms choose not to comply in this setting (where there is no uncertainty regarding a longstanding disclosure requirement, the market should be aware that managers have private information regarding PRE, the firms are heavily followed by market participants, and the required disclosures either require minimal effort or calculations that should be routine for these sophisticated firms), they are unlikely to comply in more complex, less transparent settings. Hence, this setting can be viewed as establishing a lower bound for mandatory disclosure noncompliance.
Permanently Reinvested Earnings Literature
As discussed earlier, several studies examine the consequences of the PRE designation. These studies provide evidence that the ability to avoid accruing deferred taxes by declaring PRE impacts decisions regarding the location of foreign operations (Graham et al. 2011) , the repatriation of foreign earnings (Graham et al. 2011; Blouin et al. 2012a) , the amount and location of foreign cash (Blouin et al. 2012a; Blouin et al. 2012b) , and investments (Bryant-Kutcher et al. 2008; De Waegenaere and Sansing 2008; Hanlon et al. 2012; Edwards et al. 2013) . Other studies examine the market valuation of TAX and find that investors capitalize both disclosed and estimated TAX (e.g., Collins et al. 2001; Oler et al. 2007) , with TAX being capitalized to a greater extent when a firm actually discloses TAX in addition to PRE (e.g., Bauman and Shaw 2008).
In general, these studies rely on the assumption that the disclosed PRE and TAX is truthful and complete and do not examine whether or to what extent firms comply with the mandatory reporting requirements of ASC 740. In a contemporaneous paper, Eiler and Kutcher (2012) examine why some firms disclose TAX while others do not. Consistent with our analyses, they find that TAX disclosure is decreasing in industry competition, which confirms (using a different sample) that proprietary costs are an important determinant of TAX mandatory disclosures compliance. In contrast to our study, Eiler and Kutcher (2012) (a) rely on the assumption that firms disclose PRE, (b) do not investigate compliance with the PRE disclosure, (c) do not derive estimates of PRE or TAX, which allow (i) the quantification of the amounts of undisclosed earnings trapped abroad and related undisclosed tax liabilities and (ii) important conclusions regarding the practicability of computing TAX, and (d) do not investigate the effect of the AJCA on PRE disclosures, which provides insight into how the anticipation of future regulatory action impacts mandatory disclosure compliance. Accordingly, our study makes key contributions distinct from Eiler and Kutcher (2012) .
III. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Design Overview
We organize the discussion of our research design as follows. Section 3.2 discusses our procedures for determining which firms are required to disclose PRE. After identifying these firms, we conduct our disclosure analyses in four stages. In our first stage, discussed in Section 3.3, we estimate the amount of PRE and TAX. In our second and third stages, discussed in Section 3.4, we investigate the determinants of PRE and TAX disclosure, respectively. In our fourth stage, discussed in Section 3.5, we investigate the effects of the AJCA on PRE and TAX disclosure.
Identification of Firms Required to Disclose PRE and TAX
We review S&P 500 firms' SEC 10-K filings from 1997 to 2010 to identify firms required to disclose PRE during our sample period. 13 We first review each firm's income tax disclosures and identify firm-years that include an explicit disclosure of PRE, TAX, or a statement that estimating TAX is not practicable. We treat all firms making any of these disclosures as required to disclose PRE. Next, we review each firm's effective tax rate (ETR) reconciliation. These disclosures reconcile a firm's ETR to the domestic federal statutory rate and, as mandated under ASC 740-10-50-12, list reconciling items that result in a material difference between a firm's ETR and the domestic federal tax rate. We collect data on reconciling line items related to foreign operations. Reconciling items related to foreign tax rate differentials that reduce the firm's effective tax rate suggest that the firm designated at least some of its foreign earnings as permanently reinvested and, thus, is required to disclose PRE. 14 Collecting data on reconciling items serves two purposes. First, it allows us to identify firms that are required to disclose PRE but fail to do so. Second, it allows us to develop an estimate of PRE and TAX for all firms in our sample regardless of whether they actually disclose PRE or TAX.
Our data collection process identifies firms that comply with the ASC 740 disclosure requirements (i.e., firms disclosing PRE, many of which also have a rate reconciliation item) and firms that fail to comply with the ASC 740 disclosure requirements (e.g., firms that do not disclose PRE but have a rate reconciliation item). This process yields a sample of 3,416 firm-year observations subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements of ASC 740.
Stage 1: Estimation of PRE and TAX
We use the ETR reconciliation disclosures discussed above to first estimate a firm's TAX and then to estimate a firm's PRE. Specifically, for firms identified as required to disclose PRE, we collect ETR reconciling items related to current tax rate differentials due to foreign operations (Reconciling Foreign ), earnings from prior years designated as PRE in the current year (Reconciling NonCurrentPRE ), repatriations (Reconciling Repat ), and reversal of earnings previously designated PRE 14 Donohoe et al. (2012) indicate that firms often put other items not related to foreign tax rate differentials into the foreign ETR line item. They specifically identify foreign tax credits, repatriations, subpart F income, foreign export incentives, and audit settlements as being misclassified in their example disclosures. In general, repatriations, subpart F income, and audit settlements increase the effective tax rate, which would result in us improperly excluding firms that actually have foreign rate benefits from PRE. Foreign tax credits and foreign export incentives can decrease the effective tax rate, potentially resulting in improperly including firms in our sample. We note that the majority of firms disclose foreign tax credits and export benefits as separate line items, or if they did not, they discuss them in the footnote (which is how Donohoe et al. 2012 identified the misclassified items). We exclude firm-years if there is ambiguity about whether the ETR item was negative due to PRE or negative due to misclassifications (e.g., where the firm discussed foreign tax credits or export benefits without a separate ETR reconciliation line item and without clearly specifying the magnitude of the foreign tax credits or export benefits relative to the rate benefit). As such, we believe we are able to correctly determine whether a firm is required to disclose PRE. Adding comfort that our method allows us to correctly identify firms with PRE that fail to comply with disclosure requirements, we note that 85 percent of our sample non-disclosers do acknowledge in their financial statements that they have PRE even though they do not disclose the amount. For example, Trane (formerly known as American Standard) reported a $16.5 million ETR benefit in its December 31, 2002 financial statements, but its PRE disclosure consisted only of the statement "No provision is made for U.S. income taxes applicable to undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries that are indefinitely reinvested," which acknowledges the existence of PRE but does not comply with the disclosure requirements. See Appendix B for another sample disclosure for a firm acknowledging PRE but failing to disclose the PRE amount.
(Reconciling Reversal ). 15 These reconciling items can be disclosed as a dollar amount or as a percentage. If the firm discloses reconciling items as percentages, we convert the percentages into dollar amounts by multiplying the percentages by pre-tax income. We then estimate the accumulated TAX in year t associated with the accumulated PRE (TAX Estimated ) as follows:
If TAX Estimated is negative, we set it equal to zero. Because TAX Estimated is based on three years of data, it could be less than zero, for example, if a firm repatriates 10 years' worth of permanently reinvested earnings. Based on our methodology, TAX Estimated also equals zero for firms disclosing PRE but not disclosing material ETR reconciling items related to PRE (for the current and two preceding years).
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Accordingly, TAX Estimated is a conservative measure because it only captures (1) the taxes on the prior three years of permanently reinvested earnings and (2) ETR reconciling items that were material enough to warrant disclosure.
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Next, we estimate a firm's PRE (PRE Estimated ) using the following formula:
In this calculation, we first gross up TAX Estimated by the difference between the U.S. statutory rate and the firm's foreign ETR (FETR) to produce an estimate of 15 Note that only Reconciling Foreign and Reconciling Non-CurrentPRE are used to determine which firms are required to disclose PRE because these items indicate that the firm has accumulated PRE at the end of the current year. Approximately 69.0% of our sample firms are included due to a Reconciling Foreign item, 27% are included due to disclosing PRE, 2.5% are included due to disclosing that TAX is "not practicable" to calculate, and 1.1% are included due to disclosing an actual TAX amount. None of our sample firms disclose Reconciling Non-CurrentPRE without also disclosing one of the other four items. See Appendix B for details on our data collection process. 16 While TAX is likely to be greater than zero for these firms, the absence of material ETR reconciliation items related to PRE suggests a level of TAX that is less than the TAX for firms disclosing material ETR reconciliation items related to PRE. As such, our estimate of TAX Estimated for firms without ETR reconciling items, while understated, should correctly identify that these firms have lower TAX than other sample firms. 17 The intensive data collection required to estimate PRE and TAX limits our ability to base estimates of PRE and TAX on all historical footnote data available. Accordingly we use three years of data to estimate PRE and TAX to ensure a consistent estimation approach across firms. BM equals a firm's book-to-market ratio and proxies for growth opportunities as well as information asymmetry between firms and investors (Verrecchia 1990; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Atiase et al. 2005; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Robinson and Schmidt 2013) . Because BM proxies for multiple constructs, we do not make a directional prediction. We set Debt and Equity equal to one if the firm issued debt or equity, respectively, in year t, and zero otherwise. We expect a positive coefficient on both indicator variables because firms tend to disclose more information when raising capital (Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Heitzman et al. 2010) . We set Litigation equal to one if the firm is in a litigious industry based on the Francis et al. (1994) industry classifications, and zero otherwise. We expect a positive coefficient on Litigation because prior literature generally finds that firms disclose more information to prevent shareholder lawsuits (e.g., Skinner 1994). We include an indicator for loss firm-years (Loss). Verrecchia and Weber (2006) argue that loss firms may be more likely to withhold information to avoid incurring proprietary costs in addition to costs associated with their poor current year performance while Baginski et al. (2004) argue that loss firms may disclose more information to explain their performance.
As such, we do not make a directional prediction for Loss.
We include the ranked Herfindahl index (HHI) as our measure of proprietary costs (Bamber and Cheon 1998; Verrecchia and Weber 2006) . We define proprietary costs as the costs of disclosing sensitive information to competitors, investors, and creditors (Verrecchia 1983) . Higher values of HHI indicate that the firm operates in a more concentrated (less competitive) industry. We expect a positive association between Disclosure and HHI because firms in more concentrated, less competitive industries have less 19 Although lack of access to confidential IRS data makes it difficult to directly link PRE or TAX disclosures to political costs, anecdotal evidence does suggest a link. For example, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, both PRE disclosers since the start of our sample, have been subject to a Congressional investigation focused on PRE and other offshoring issues (Levin and Coburn 2012; Dixon 2012 ).
fear of competition and a lower cost associated with disclosing proprietary information (in this setting, the amount and duration of earnings invested abroad and the related tax costs of repatriating such investment). Consistent with prior studies (Verrecchia and Weber 2006; Heitzman et al. 2010) , we include proxies for profitability to control for any impact performance has on the disclosure decision.
Because PRE and TAX relate directly to foreign profits, we control for profitability by including separate measures of domestic (PROA_Domestic) and foreign (PROA_Foreign) profitability. We make no directional prediction for either measure. We include the number of analysts (NAnalyst) as a proxy for information demand. We expect a positive association between Disclosure and NAnalyst because analyst following is positively associated with information demand, which should increase disclosure (Francis et al. 2008; Zechman 2010 ). We include Inst, which represents the percentage of shares owned by institutions. We expect a negative association between Disclosure and Inst because higher institutional ownership represents lower information asymmetry and therefore, less need for disclosure (Bushee et al. 2003 ). Finally, we include the natural log of sales (LnSales) to control for size. We make no directional prediction for the coefficient on LnSales because firm size proxies for a number of factors.
Stage 3: Determinants of TAX Disclosure
To investigate the determinants of TAX disclosure, we define Disclosure equal to one if the firm discloses the actual TAX amount and zero if the firm does not disclose TAX or if the firm discloses that TAX is not practicable to determine. Because TAX disclosure is less common when PRE is not disclosed, we estimate our TAX model on the subsample of firms that actually disclose PRE. 20 Unlike PRE disclosure which is mandatory for firms in our sample, we anticipate that managers are likely to view TAX as a voluntary disclosure because ASC 740 allows managers to disclose that TAX is not practicable to determine rather than disclosing the actual amount of TAX (refer to footnote 11 for anecdotal evidence corroborating this view Table 1 provides the details of our sample selection process. We limit our sample to firms appearing in the S&P 500 (per CRSP) at any time between 1999 and 2010 (850 firms). Focusing on S&P 500 firms results in a manageable sample for hand-collection of data while ensuring that analyses utilize an economically significant component of the population of firms (e.g., Bauman and Shaw 2008; Bamber et al. 2010) . We eliminate firms without Compustat or 10-K data necessary for our analyses, firms not subject to corporate tax (e.g., REITs), foreign firms, and subsidiaries of other firms. This results in an initial sample of 7,668 firm-year observations.
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample Selection
For each firm-year, we collect (if disclosed) a firm's (a) cumulative amount of disclosed PRE (PRE Reported ), (b) cumulative amount of disclosed TAX (TAX Reported ), (c) current year ETR benefit from declaring current earnings permanently reinvested ( ), (d) current year tax expense or benefit associated with repatriations ( ), (e) current year tax expense associated with removing the PRE designation from prior year foreign earnings ( ), and (f) current year tax benefit associated with converting prior year foreign earnings to PRE ( ). We also record when a firm does not disclose a specific TAX amount but instead discloses that TAX is not practicable. See Appendix B for examples of a typical and a comprehensive footnote disclosure.
From the hand-collected sample of 7,668 firms, we then impose additional data requirements (e.g., ability to calculate a Foreign ETR) and limit our sample to firms required to disclose PRE, as discussed in Section 3.2, resulting in an initial sample of 3,416 firm-years (480 firms). After requiring data necessary in our regression analyses (e.g., analysts and institutional ownership data), our sample consists of 3,097 firm-year observations. to 81.2% in 2010. This trend runs counter to the general increase in firms disclosing PRE over the sample 21 The AJCA created IRC Section 965 allowing firms to receive an 85 percent dividends received deduction on cash dividends from controlled foreign corporations. However, this dividend is limited to the greater of $500 million or the amount shown as PRE prior to June 30, 2003. As such, firms reporting PRE were much more likely to derive a substantial benefit from Section 965 relative to firms with undisclosed PRE. Section 965 was commonly referred to as the "dividend tax holiday." 22 We note that non-disclosure of PRE affects even the largest, most well-known firms. For example, Dell, GE, and Pepsi changed from non-disclosers in one year (2001) In sum, descriptive data suggest that our estimates for PRE and TAX are sufficient to (a) provide a lower bound of undisclosed PRE and TAX, (b) evaluate cross-sectionally how the magnitude of PRE and TAX influences disclosure, and (c) assess the practicability of estimating TAX. With respect to assessing the practicability of TAX, our ability to generate reasonable proxies for the undisclosed tax based on three years of ETR reconciliation data suggests that firms employ an especially lenient definition of "not practicable." Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (1) with Disclosure equal to one for firmyears in which a firm complies with the requirements of ASC 740 and discloses PRE, and zero otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics
V. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Determinants of PRE Disclosure
We find an insignificant coefficient on PRE Estimated /PI (p-value = 0.3860) and positive and significant coefficient on TAX Estimated /PI (p-value = 0.0600). These results suggest that concern over the materiality of the unrecorded tax liability associated with PRE motivates PRE disclosure more so than the materiality of PRE itself. To assess the impact of TAX on the probability of PRE disclosure, we compute the marginal effects (untabulated) and find that a one standard deviation increase in TAX Estimated /PI increases the probability of disclosure by 2.6%.
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The remaining variables included in equation (1) are consistent with expectations when significant. The coefficient on Litigation is positive and significant (p-value = 0.0025), suggesting that firms are more likely to comply with ASC 740 and disclose PRE when the firm operates in a more in a litigious industry (i.e., when failing to comply with disclosure requirements is potentially more costly).
The coefficient on HHI is also positive and significant (p-value = 0.0515), indicating that firms in less competitive industries are more likely to disclose PRE. Because disclosing PRE can reveal proprietary information about the foreign countries in which the firm operates, the tax savings attributable to those operations, and expectations of future investment in those countries, this result is consistent with proprietary costs reducing disclosure. Finally, we also find a positive and significant coefficient on
LnSales (p-value = 0.0860), suggesting that larger firms are more likely to comply with the PRE disclosure requirements under ASC 740. Tables 5 and 6 collectively, the materiality of PRE does not appear to increase compliance in either the PRE or TAX disclosure decisions. The magnitude of the TAX is important though, with firms with more material TAX being more likely to disclose PRE but less likely to disclose the actual TAX balance. These results suggest that firms with larger, more material TAX are more likely to comply with the minimum disclosure requirements under ASC 740 (i.e., disclose PRE) but are less willing to disclose the information that allows investors to better understand the extent of the cash and financial reporting ramifications if that PRE is ultimately repatriated to the U.S. (i.e., disclose TAX).
Determinants of TAX Disclosure
The remaining variables included in equation (1) are consistent with expectations when significant. We find a positive and significant coefficient on HHI (p-value = 0.0210) indicating that firms in less competitive industries are more likely to disclose TAX. Because disclosing TAX reveals the magnitude of the tax benefits associated with operating in one or more low tax jurisdictions, this result is consistent with proprietary costs reducing disclosure in this setting. In light of prior mixed evidence regarding the relation between mandatory disclosure compliance and proprietary costs (e.g., Li et al. (1997) , Robinson et al. (2011), and Chen et al. (2013) find no relation; Robinson and Schmidt (2013) find a relation), our evidence is consistent with (a) the effect of proprietary costs on mandatory disclosure compliance varying across settings (i.e., with the specific proprietary costs of different required disclosures) and (b) disclosure of earnings permanently reinvested abroad and the related unrecorded tax liability on repatriation having higher proprietary costs than disclosures in other settings (e.g., detailed compensation disclosures or environmental liabilities).
We find a negative and significant coefficient on Inst (p-value = 0.0885), consistent with decreased demand for additional disclosures when information asymmetry is low. Although we made no predictions with respect to PROA_Foreign or LnSales, we find a positive and significant coefficient on
PROA_Foreign (p-value = 0.0370) and a negative and significant coefficient on LnSales (p-value = 0.0710). This latter result is interesting because, when considered with the earlier PRE results, it demonstrates that larger firms are more likely to comply with the minimum disclosure requirements (i.e., disclose PRE) but less likely to provide supplemental information (i.e., disclose TAX).
5.3.
The Impact of the AJCA on PRE and TAX Disclosure Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (2), which is intended to determine if the AJCA had a material impact on PRE and TAX disclosure decisions. In Column 1 (Column 2), we present the results from estimating equation (2) with Disclosure equal to PRE disclosure (TAX disclosure). The key variables of interest in these analyses are AJCA and Post2005. Recall that the amount of foreign earnings a firm was allowed to repatriate at a reduced rate under the AJCA was limited to the greater of $500 million or the amount of PRE disclosed in the firm's financial statements. As such, the AJCA provided an incentive for firms to disclose PRE but did not provide a similar incentive for a firm to disclose TAX. Consistent with the changing incentives around the AJCA, the coefficient on AJCA is positive and significant when PRE disclosure is the dependent variable (p-value = 0.0395) but insignificant when TAX disclosure is the dependent variable (p-value = 0.2660). These results are consistent with firms increasing PRE disclosure in anticipation of another tax holiday in the future that, like the AJCA, may be based on a firm's disclosed PRE. Marginal effects indicate that firms are 3.3% more likely to disclose PRE during the AJCA period relative to the pre-AJCA period. Interestingly, the coefficient on Post2005 is positive but not quite significant when PRE disclosure is the dependent variable (p-value = 0.1015) and the coefficient on Post2005 remains insignificant when TAX disclosure is the dependent variable. 26 This result suggests that any improvement in disclosure in response to the AJCA was most concentrated around the AJCA itself. 27 Collectively, these results are interesting because they demonstrate the impact of a tax law change on financial reporting behavior, and more specifically, mandatory disclosure compliance. All other results presented in Table 7 are similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6 .
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulators and financial commentators have expressed concerns that the implications of PRE are not transparent to investors as a result of missing or insufficient financial statement disclosures. To shed light on these concerns, we use a sample of S&P 500 firms from 1999 to 2010 to investigate firms' noncompliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements for PRE (and its related TAX) and the factors associated with any noncompliance. Our analysis provides several interesting conclusions regarding firms' choices to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements of ASC 740.
First, we find that a nontrivial percentage of sample firms (11.7% to 18.2% annually) do not disclose PRE despite electing to designate a substantial amount of their earnings as PRE. We also find that annually 72.9% to 81.2% of firms either disclose that TAX is not practicable to calculate or provide no mention of TAX at all. The large percentage of firms disclosing PRE but not disclosing TAX is interesting given that (a) many of these firms calculate and disclose the tax benefit associated with current year foreign earnings that are deemed permanently reinvested annually in their effective tax rate reconciliation and (b) we are able to derive reasonable estimates of TAX from the effective tax rate reconciliations. Annually, we conservatively estimate that the aggregate estimated undisclosed PRE 26 We re-estimate the analysis in Table 7 for the subsample of firms most likely to benefit from a future repatriation tax holiday similar to the AJCA (i.e., those firms that repatriated at any point in our sample period). We find that the coefficients on both AJCA and Post2005 are positive and highly significant (p-values<0.0050) when PRE disclosure is the dependent variable. All other inferences hold. Further, marginal effects indicate that these firms are approximately 7.5% more likely to disclose PRE in both the AJCA and Post2005 periods relative to the pre-AJCA period. These results provide additional evidence that the expected benefits of disclosure play an important role in the disclosure decision. 27 We note in the descriptive analyses in Table 2 that the percentage of PRE non-disclosers increased in 2000 and then began to decline in 2001. To ensure that the coefficients for AJCA and Post2005 capture a time effect unique to the passage of the AJCA (as opposed to a general time trend unrelated to the AJCA), we re-estimate the analyses in Table 7 after excluding 1999 and 2000 observations. All inferences hold.
(TAX) ranges from a low of $9.9 ($9.6) billion to a high of $84.2 ($82.2) billion. Collectively, these results suggest that (a) a significant portion of firms fail to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements for PRE, (b) noncompliance spans a long window of time and is an issue among even the largest, most sophisticated firms in the U.S. capital markets (i.e., S&P 500 firms), and (c) the amounts of undisclosed PRE and TAX are substantial in magnitude.
Second, we model firms' choice to comply with the mandatory PRE disclosure requirements as a function of the magnitude of a firm's estimated PRE and estimated TAX as well as other variables previously shown to influence disclosure decisions. Our results suggest that concern over the magnitude of the unrecorded TAX (i.e., the unrecorded liability associated with PRE) motivates PRE disclosure more so than the magnitude of the PRE itself. We also find that firms operating in more litigious or less competitive industries are more likely to disclose PRE, suggesting that legal concerns (e.g., Skinner 1994) and proprietary costs (e.g., Verrecchia 1983) are significant determinants of mandatory PRE disclosure compliance. Finally, we find that larger firms are more likely to disclose PRE. Collectively, these results suggest that firms strategically choose not to comply with the mandatory PRE requirements.
Third, we estimate the determinants of firms' choice to disclose TAX. We find that firms are more likely to disclose TAX if they operate in a less competitive industry (consistent with lower proprietary costs, e.g., Verrecchia 1983) or if they have lower institutional ownership (consistent with increased demand for additional disclosures when information asymmetry is high). We also find that TAX disclosure increases with foreign profitability and decreases with firm size. Combined with the evidence that PRE disclosure increases with firm size, this evidence suggests that larger firms are more likely to comply with the minimum disclosure requirements (i.e., disclose PRE) but less likely to provide supplemental information (i.e., disclose TAX). Interestingly, we find evidence that firms choose to disclose that estimating TAX is not practicable or provide no mention of TAX when the financial statement impact of the TAX is larger. Consistent with Robinson et al. (2011) , this evidence suggests that firms are less likely to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements if such disclosure may reflect negatively on the firm (e.g., the firm has larger unrecorded tax liabilities associated with PRE).
Finally, we investigate how firms respond to the increased disclosure incentives around the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allowed firms to repatriate foreign earnings at a substantially discounted tax rate under certain conditions. Consistent with the AJCA creating additional incentives to disclose PRE, we find a distinct increase in PRE disclosure in the years immediately following the AJCA.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, we address regulators' concerns that the implications of PRE are not transparent to investors due to noncompliance with the disclosure requirements mandated by ASC 740. We provide evidence of significant noncompliance with PRE disclosure requirements and particularly lenient application of the TAX disclosure requirements, suggesting that regulators' concerns are justified. Specifically, we find that a significant percentage of firms fail to comply with the GAAP reporting requirements for PRE and, for those firms disclosing PRE, the vast majority choose either to disclose that TAX is not practicable to calculate or provide no mention of TAX. Though we acknowledge the inherent complexity in estimating the unrecorded deferred tax on foreign earnings designated as PRE (or similarly, the deferred tax on foreign earnings not designated as PRE ) and are careful to point out that the disclosure that the tax on PRE is not practicable is allowed under ASC 740, our ability to generate reasonable proxies for the undisclosed tax based on three years of ETR reconciliation data suggests that firms employ an especially lenient definition of "not practicable."
Moreover, our evidence indicating that PRE and TAX disclosure decisions are a function of factors known to influence voluntary disclosures (e.g., litigation risk, industry competition) as well as the increased disclosure incentives around the AJCA suggests managers opportunistically choose when to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements under ASC 740. Collectively, this evidence of noncompliance should be important to regulators as they assess the sufficiency of current PRE and TAX disclosures.
Second, this study contributes to the growing literature that investigates noncompliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. By providing evidence that firms strategically choose not to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in a setting involving a long-standing mandatory disclosure requirement where (a) there is no ambiguity in the requirement or nature of the disclosure or underlying transactions requiring disclosure, (b) the market should be aware that managers have private information regarding PRE (because financial statements reflect the tax benefit of permanently reinvested earnings), (c) the firms are heavily followed by market participants, and (d) the required disclosures either require minimal effort or calculations that should be routine for sophisticated firms, this study can be viewed as establishing a lower bar for mandatory disclosure noncompliance. In other words, if firms exhibit noncompliance in our setting, firms are even more likely to exhibit noncompliance in more complex, less transparent settings. Our evidence that firms in highly competitive industries are less likely to disclose PRE and TAX is also particularly important in light of prior mixed evidence regarding the relation between mandatory disclosure compliance and proprietary costs. Our findings suggests that (a) the effect of proprietary costs on mandatory disclosure compliance varies with the specific proprietary costs of different required disclosures and (b) disclosure of earnings permanently reinvested abroad has higher
proprietary costs than disclosures in other settings (e.g., detailed compensation disclosures or environmental liabilities). Finally, by providing evidence of increased PRE (but not TAX) disclosure in the years immediately following the AJCA, our study suggests that mandatory disclosure compliance is not only influenced by the current regulatory environment (e.g., SEC enforcement actions as in Robinson et al. 2011) , but also manager's anticipation of future regulatory action that would affect the net cost of compliance. This result suggests that regulators need to consider not only the immediate impact of a temporary regulation but also how that temporary regulation may affect future expectations and, thus, distort managerial behavior.
Third, this study develops an estimate of PRE and TAX that is independent of whether firms actually explicitly disclose such information. Existing research examining the implications of PRE relies on disclosed PRE. It is possible that the implications (e.g., likelihood that management uses the "trapped" funds inefficiently, etc.) of PRE may vary based on whether PRE is disclosed in the financial statements.
As such, these estimates have implications for future research. Bauman and Shaw (2008) , FETR it equals the ratio of the sum of current foreign taxes from year t-2 to year t (txfo-txdfo) to the sum of pre-tax foreign income (pifo) from year t-2 to year t. FETR it is set to 0 if the sum of current foreign taxes from year t-2 to year t is negative. FETR it is set equal to one if the sum of current taxes is positive and the sum of pre-tax foreign income is negative. Values of FETR it greater than one are set equal to one. Pre-tax foreign income in a given year is set equal to zero if a firm-year is missing pre-tax foreign income and reports zero current foreign taxes. Current foreign tax in a given year is set equal to zero if the firm-year is missing current foreign taxes and reports zero pre-tax foreign income. If a firm-year is missing both pre-tax foreign income and current foreign taxes, both are set to zero only if the firm also reports no ETR effect from foreign operations. PRE Estimatedit /PI it equals the ratio of firm i's PRE Estimatedit to the sum of pretax income (pi) from year t-2 to year t. NAnalyst it equals the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for firm i in year t (I/B/E/S numest).
Appendix
Inst it equals firm i's ratio of the number of shares held by institutional investors (Thompson Reuters 13F database shares/1,000,000) to total shares outstanding (Thompson Reuters 13F database shrout1) at the end of year t.
Litigation it an indicator variable equal to one if firm i operates in a highly litigated industry (based on the Francis et al. 1994 classifications) , and zero otherwise. Highly litigated industries are defined as SIC 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, and 5200-5961 .
HHI it equals the decile ranking of the Herfindahl index in year t for firm i's industry. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms (listed on Compustat) within a particular two-digit SIC in year t. A firm's market share equals the ratio of its sales (sale) in year t to the sum of sales for all firms in its two-digit SIC code in year t.
PROA_Domestic it equals firm i's ratio of domestic pretax income (pidom) to total assets (at) at the end of year t.
PROA_Foreign it equals firm i's ratio of foreign pretax income (pifo) to total assets (at) at the end of year t.
LnSales it equals the natural log of firm i's sales (sale) at the end of year t.
Loss it an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports a loss in year t (ni < 0), and zero otherwise. During the year, the Company repatriated approximately $710 million of earnings and capital which carried a cash tax charge of $24 million. This amount was less than the charge recorded during the year due to the impact of favorable movements in foreign currency. This cost was further offset by foreign tax related items of $16 million, reducing the net cost of repatriation to $8 million. The Company has provided $18 million of deferred taxes related to the remaining $290 million of unremitted foreign earnings. These amounts are reflected in the foreign earnings repatriation line item. At January 3, 2009, accumulated foreign subsidiary earnings of approximately $834 million were considered indefinitely invested in those businesses. Accordingly, U.S. income deferred taxes have not been provided on these earnings and it is not practical to estimate the deferred tax impact of those earnings.
AJCA
Treatment: This example contains the maximum amount of disclosures a firm can make in one year. While rare, this provides insight into our overall data collection process. As described in Section 4.1, we collected the (a) cumulative amount of disclosed PRE ($834 million, PRE Reported ), (b) cumulative amount of disclosed TAX (or "not practicable" disclosure, as is the case here), (c) current year ETR benefit from declaring current earnings permanently reinvested (-5%, ), (d) current year tax expense or benefit associated with repatriation ($8 million expense, ), (e) current year tax expense associated with removing the PRE designation from prior year foreign earnings ($18 million, ), (f) current year tax benefit associated with converting prior year foreign earnings to PRE (not applicable -since Kellogg has item (e) this year they will not have item (f)).
Part 3: Non-Discloser
Coach 6/30/2007 Tax Footnote:
The Company accounts for income taxes in accordance with SFAS 109, "Accounting for Income Taxes." Under SFAS 109, a deferred tax liability or asset is recognized for the estimated future tax consequences of temporary differences between the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities in the financial statements and their respective tax bases. Coach does not provide for U.S. income taxes on the unremitted earnings of its foreign subsidiaries as the Company intends to permanently reinvest these earnings. Treatment: This firm separately discloses its foreign tax rate differential, which we capture in our data collection (e.g., -$13.892 million in 2007). Despite the presence of an ETR reconciling item and an explicit statement that the firm does not record U.S. taxes on permanently reinvested earnings, this firm makes no disclosure related to either PRE or TAX. Pseudo-R 2 3.73 % Correctly Predicted 63% ***, **, * represent significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively. We use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. We report one-tailed p-values for coefficients with directional predictions and define variables in Appendix A. Pseudo-R 2 2.96 % Correctly Predicted 62% ***, **, * indicate significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively. We use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. We report one-tailed p-values for coefficients with directional predictions and define variables in Appendix A. Pseudo-R 2 3.95 3.03 % Correctly Predicted 64% 62% ***, **, * indicate significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively. We use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. We report one-tailed p-values for coefficients with directional predictions and define variables in Appendix A.
Fiscal Year Ended
